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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
 Human life always is full of pain. In Buddhism, the human world is “the bitter human 
world (簍豸).” Existential philosopher Søren Kierkegaard said, “I struggle, therefore I am.” He 
thought that fighting with evil is the existential decision. What is evil and how have human 
persons striven to overcome the problem of evil? In encountering evil some people seem to 
accept it as their fate, and others seem to avoid the problem of evil by focusing on an afterlife. 
Philosophers have been interested in the definition of evil and origin of evil. Theologians, 
however, in addition to these questions, also have to answer the problem of evil in relation to 
God.  
 Many theologians have tried to prove the righteousness of God and to settle the problem 
of evil in Christian history. Theologians’ efforts have been responses to these questions: how can 
we continue to affirm the lordship of God in the face of horrendous evil and if God is both 
omnipotent and good, why is there so much evil in the world? The “problem of evil” has been a 
controversial topic that could not be easily solved. Daniel L. Migliore says: 
In relation to divine providence and the “problem of evil,” the efforts of theology 
to clarify the claims of faith seem pitifully weak and unsatisfying. All grandiose 
theological systems that purport to have an answer to every question are exposed 
as illusory by the monstrous presence of evil and suffering in the world. Radical  
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evil is the disturbing “interruption” of all theological thinking and speaking about 
God and especially about the providential rule of God.1  
 
 Theologians have had to prove the righteousness of God against the evident problem of 
evil, and Gottfried Leibniz named this ‘theodicy’ in his work, Théodicée, which originated from 
the Greek șİȩȢ “God” and įަțȘ “justice.” John Hick identified two major traditions in the history 
of theodicy: the Augustinian theodicy, based on the writings of Augustine of Hippo, and the 
Irenaean theodicy, based on the thinking of St. Irenaeus. 
 The Augustinian theodicy proposes that evil only exists as a corruption of good and 
occurs because of the depravity of humans’ free will. According to this tradition, God is not the 
cause of evil and evil is not substance but just deficiency of good. On the other hand, the 
Irenaean theodicy denies that humanity and the world were perfect at the time of creation and 
suggests that moral perfection is only attainable through the experience of suffering. This theory 
says that human suffering exists for human development. Other approaches are the process 
theodicy of Alfred North Whitehead, Holocaust theodicy, the person-making theodicy of John 
Hick, and so on. Many theologians have explained theodicy in their own ways but each 
encounters intractable problems.  
 The purpose of this thesis is to supplement the doctrine of theodicy with Laozi (緢螲). I 
will examine how the thought of Laozi can enhance the understanding of the Christian God and 
explore the problem of theodicy in this thesis. The reason Laozi can bring insights to theologians 
is because the understanding of the ultimate reality itself is different between East and West. He 
                                                
 1 Daniel L. Migliore, Faith Seeking Understanding: An Introduction to Christian Theology (Michigan: Wm. 
B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1991), 99.  
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understands that Dao is not benevolent and good and evil coexist in the ultimate reality. 
Moreover, Laozi sees good and evil as fluid and exchangeable elements rather than seeing them 
as fixed and eternal as in Christianity. Laozi cannot settle problems of theodicy completely but 
leads us to a new chapter of this debate. In addition, the East’s different view about eternal 
reality helps us to understand the doctrine of theodicy.  
 The main discourse of this thesis is divided into three parts. In chapter two, I will explain 
the doctrines of theodicy in Christian history and their intractable problems. In chapter three, I 
will investigate the relationship between Christian theology and Dao in Laozi. I will briefly 
explain Laozi’s important Daoistic notions, and I will look into divine elements that appear in the 
concept of Dao as articulated by Laozi. Also I will try to reveal the transcendence of Dao and the 
omnipresence of Dao which are considered important topics in theology. In chapter four, I will 
supplement the doctrine of theodicy with Laozi. I will explain the incomprehensibility of the 
ultimate reality, creativity and receptivity of Dao, and the unbenevolence of Dao. Moreover, I 
will explore how Dao does not rule creatures and contains both good and evil. Based on these 
properties of Dao, I will try to overcome the problem of evil in Laozi’s thought. As a part of the 
conclusion, I briefly summarized my perspectives and analyzed this study.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
THEODICIES IN CHRISTIAN HISTORY AND  
THEIR INTRACTABLE PROBLEMS 
 
 
 Thoughts about theodicy might coincide with the beginning of religion because religious 
people usually think about the problem of how to live in relation to the ultimate reality. In 
Christian theology, theologians have generally understood the problem of evil in three ways. The 
first way of understanding this phenomenon is to emphasize the incomprehensibility of God. 
People cannot know why there is so much evil in the world, but they nevertheless must trust God. 
Job takes this approach to explain his suffering and highlights the mystery of God and the 
ignorance of people. God says, “Will the one who contends with the Almighty correct him? Let 
him who accuses God answer him,” and Job answers, “I am unworthy – how can I reply to you? 
I put my hand over my mouth.”2 In this perspective, putting a hand over one’s mouth is the only 
way to address the problem of evil. Calvin writes, “The story of Job, in its description of God’s 
wisdom, power, and purity, always expresses a powerful argument that overwhelms men with 
the realization of their own stupidity, impotence, and corruption.”3 Even though this theodicy 
poses a solution to the problem of evil, it suppresses all questions and doubts and encourages 
blind acceptance of all suffering. 
                                                
 2 Job 40:2-4. (NIV) 
 
 3 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 1.1.3. 
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 The second way of understanding evil is to focus on divine punishment of the wicked or 
the chastisement of God’s people. Calvin says, “The scriptures teach us that pestilence, war, and 
other calamities of this kind are chastisements of God, which he inflicts on our sins.”4 Some 
parts of the Bible support this theodicy, while others do not. Jesus teaches that the blind man was 
born blind by “neither this man nor his parents sinned.”5 This theodicy is criticized because it 
sees the relationship between sin and suffering too simplistically.6 This theodicy of punishment 
becomes destructive when applied because we must accept that God punishes all people through 
whatever terrors fall upon them. 
 The third way is to understand evil is to frame it as a divine pedagogy intended to help 
people turn to God. According to this theodicy, God sends poverty, bereavement, diseases, and 
other perils to cause us to fix our eyes on heaven rather than on the pleasures of the present life.7 
The Apostle Paul may be interpreted to support this view: “Now if we are children, then we are 
heirs--heirs of God and co-heirs with Christ, if indeed we share in his sufferings in order that we 
may also share in his glory. I consider that our present sufferings are not worth comparing with 
the glory that will be revealed in us.”8 While it is true that people can learn from their suffering, 
this does not guarantee that suffering is good. Moreover, the theodicy of divine pedagogy does 
not give careful attention to the cries of victims of injustice.  
                                                
 4 Calvin, quoted by Daniel L. Migliore, in Faith Seeking Understanding: An Introduction to Christian 
Theology, 106.  
 
 5 John 9:1-3. (NIV) 
 
 6 Daniel L. Migliore, 107.  
 
 7 Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, 3.9.1. 
 
 8 Romans 8:17-18. (NIV) 
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 These traditional theodicies appear in Christian history in the writings of many 
theologians. From late antiquity, trials which justify God were under active discussion. 
Augustine and Irenaeus are representative thinkers of the Patristic period. In modern times, 
Gottfried Leibniz and Schleiermacher, and recently, Alfred North Whitehead (Process Theodicy), 
John Roth Protest Theodicy), James Conn (Liberation Theodicy), and John Hick (Person-Making 
Theodicy) have written about theodicy. In this chapter, I will briefly explain theodicies which 
have been discussed in Christian history and will point out their intractable problems.  
 
 
Theodicy of the Patristic Period 
 
Augustine 
 Augustine (354-430) understands that God created the world with good will and that 
God’s providence is at work both in the lives of individuals and in history even though that 
involvement is largely hidden. Therefore, the whole creation is good; the sun and moon, human 
beings, birds, reptiles, fish, and animals, trees, flowers, and plants are all good, expressing as 
they do the creative fecundity of perfect goodness. Augustine does not agree with the ancient 
Platonic, Neo-Platonic, Gnostic, and Manichaean ideas regarding matter. Rather, he seeks to use 
matter and share it with gratitude to God for God’s goodness.9 
                                                
 9 John H. Hick, Evil and the God of Love (New York: Harper & Row Publisher, 1966), 45.  
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 Augustine understands evil not as any kind of positive substance or force, but as 
something gone wrong in God’s good creation. Even though everything is good, everything is 
capable of being corrupted because everything is made out of nothing. In Confessions, he claims 
that evil is not independent substance: 
Everything that exists is good, then; and so evil, the source of which I was seeking, 
cannot be a substance, because if it were, it would be good. Either it would be an 
indestructible substance, and that would mean it was very good indeed, or it would 
be a substance liable to destruction – but then it would not be destructible unless it 
were good.10 
 
 In other words, everything that exists is good because everything is created by God’s 
good will. Therefore, evil cannot exist as independent substance. Augustine realized that evil is 
simply the diminishing of the good to the point where nothing at all is left.11 For Augustine, evil 
is the “absence of being” or the “privation of being,” and this thought is affected by Neo-
Platonism. However, Augustine does not deny evil’s presence and its virulent power. He rejects 
the idea that evil does not really exist and is therefore not to be feared, saying “either that is evil 
which we fear, or the act of fearing is in itself evil.”12 
 Moreover, Augustine defends the goodness of God in claiming that evil is included in 
God’s design of creation. He says, “By the ineffable mercy of God even the penalty of man’s 
offense is turned into an instrument of virtue.”13 Specifically, Augustine claims that physical 
                                                
 10 Augustine, Confessions, VII. 12. 18.  
 
 11 Augustine, Confessions, III. 7. 12.  
 12 Augustine, Confessions, VII. 5. 
 
 13 Augustine, City of God, XIII. 4. 
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pain and disease can be sacred means of purifying and training human beings. Thus, God 
sometimes uses evil to reveal good. 
 Augustine’s theodicy is criticized for many reasons. First, if we accept God’s absolute 
power, a universe which God has created cannot have gone wrong. John Hick says, “The basic 
criticism, then, is that a flawless creation would never go wrong and that if the creation does in 
fact go wrong the ultimate responsibility for this must be with its creator.”14 Second, Augustine’s 
theodicy cannot explain natural evils of disease and earthquakes. Third, since, in Augustine’s 
theory, the eternal torment of hell would never end, it could have no constructive purpose.  
 
Irenaeus 
 Irenaeus (130-202) was Bishop of Lugdunum in Gaul, an early Church Father and 
apologist. His writings were formative in the early development of Christian theology. Irenaeus 
explains God’s creation of humanity in two steps. The first step is that human beings were 
created as intellectual beings which are endowed with the possibility of spiritual and ethical 
development. He says: 
If, however, any one say, “What then? Could not God have exhibited man as 
perfect from beginning?” Let him know that, inasmuch as God is indeed always 
the same and unbegotten as respects Himself, all things are possible to Him. But 
created things must be inferior to Him who created them, from the very fact of 
their later origin; for it was not possible for things recently created to have been 
uncreated. But inasmuch as they are not uncreated, for this very reason do they 
come short of the perfect. Because, as these things are of later date, so are they 
infantile; so are they unaccustomed to, and unexercised in, perfect discipline. For 
                                                
 14 John H. Hick, Philosophy of Religion, 4th edition (NJ: Upper Saddle River, 1990), 43.  
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as it certainly is in the power of a mother to give strong food to her infant, [but she 
does not do so], as the child is not yet able to receive more substantial 
nourishment; so also it was possible for God Himself to have made man perfect 
from the first, but man could not receive this [perfection], being as yet an infant.15 
 
 The second step is that human beings mature from mere instinctual beings to fully 
responsible children of God. Irenaeus differentiates ‘image’ from ‘likeness,’ claiming the former 
as the proper translation of Genesis 1:26. Human beings were created in the image of God but 
their status is different from likeness of God. Achieving the likeness of God can only be obtained 
through long-term training. John Hick explains this:  
 Irenaeus distinguishes between the image of God and the likeness of God in man. 
The ‘imago’, which resides in man’s bodily form, apparently represents his nature 
as an intelligent creature capable of fellowship with his Maker, whilst the 
‘likeness’ represents man’s final perfecting by the Holy Spirit.16  
 
 For Irenaeus, while the image of God is human beings’ nature, divine likeness is a quality 
of personal existence which finitely reflects the life of the Creator.17 Although human beings 
were created in the image of God, human beings should become closer to the likeness of God 
throughout free choice and struggle. The world is a place of “soul making” or “person making” 
and a sphere in which the second stage of the creative process is taking place.  
 Irenaeus’ approach to the problem of evil differs in important aspects from Augustine’s 
theodicy. Augustine thought that human beings were created finitely perfect and then 
                                                
 15 Irenaeus, Against Heresies, IV. 38. 1.  
 16 John H. Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 217.  
 17 Ibid., 218.  
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incomprehensibly destroyed their own perfection and plunged into sin and misery, but Irenaeus 
believed that human beings were created as immature creatures who needed to undergo moral 
development and growth and finally be brought to the perfection intended for them by God. 
Moreover, for Augustine, evil is represented as the privation of good. In contrast, Irenaeus views 
evil as a necessary possibility in the growth of humanity toward free and mature likeness of God. 
 Irenaeus’ theodicy has been criticized for various reasons. First, Irenaeus’ theodicy 
rejects traditional doctrines of the Fall of humanity and of final damnation. Second, this theodicy 
cannot justify the actual extent of human suffering such as the Jewish Holocaust. A third critical 
question is whether or not a painful creative process can be the expression of divine goodness 
even if it leads to infinite good.   
 
 
Modern Theodicy 
 
Leibniz 
 Gottfried Leibniz (1646-1716) proposes that if God elects to create a dependent universe, 
and God is perfect, God will necessarily create the best possible universe. The best possible 
universe is that which permits a maximization of being. He says: 
One may say that as soon as God has decreed to create something there is a 
struggle between all the possibles, all of them laying claim to existence, and that 
those which, being united, produce most reality, most perfection, most 
significance carry the day. It is true that all this struggle can only be ideal, that is 
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to say, it can only be a conflict of reasons in the most perfect understanding, 
which cannot fail to act in the most perfect way, and consequently to choose the 
best.18 
 
 Leibniz stands within the broad Augustinian tradition in his attempt to reconcile human 
freedom with divine sovereignty. He acknowledges evil’s reality even though he still views evil 
as always a privation of goodness and being. This principle, which accommodates these evils 
into the best possible world, comes from the aesthetic principle that a good whole may contain 
parts that are partially bad. Leibniz says: “Not only does [God] derive from [evils] greater goods, 
but he finds them connected with the greatest goods of all those that are possible: so that it would 
be a fault not to permit them”19 and “a little acid, sharpness or bitterness is often more pleasing 
than sugar; shadows enhance colors; even a dissonance in the right place gives relief to 
harmony.”20 Leibniz understands that all the evils of the world contribute to the character of the 
whole as the best of all possible universes in ways that we cannot now trace. 
 Karl Barth criticizes Leibniz’s theodicy that “at bottom he hardly had any serious interest 
(and from the practical standpoint none at all) in the problem of evil.”21 John Hick also criticizes 
Leibniz, “Having shown to his own satisfaction that we are living in the best possible world, 
Leibniz was content to enjoy his own comparatively comfortable lot, leaving it to those who 
                                                
 18 Gottfried W. Leibniz, Theodicy: Essays on the Goodness of God, the Freedom of Man, and the Origin of 
Evil, trans. E. M. Haggard (London: Rouledge & Kegan Paul Ltd, 1952), 201.  
 19 Ibid., para. 127.  
 
 20 Ibid., para. 12. 
 
 21 Karl Barth, C. D. III/1, 392.  
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were less fortunate to make the best they could of it.”22 If we accept Leibniz’ theodicy that this is 
indeed the best possible world, his theodicy implies that God was powerless to make a better 
world, and so his theory denies God’s omnipotence.  
 
Schleiermacher 
 Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768-1834) was a German philosopher and theologian who 
attempted to reconcile the criticisms of the Enlightenment with traditional Protestant orthodoxy. 
He saw piety as ‘the feeling of absolute dependence’ and the various phases of this feeling are 
specified as they correspond to the various aspects of the divine nature. This is the framework 
within which Schleiermacher writes about the problem of evil. Schleiermacher has argued that 
evil ultimately serves the good purpose of God, teaching that sin and evil are ordained by God as 
the preconditions of redemption. Hick understands that “Schleiermacher, it might be complained, 
is arguing that since God wills man’s redemption, and since redemption presupposes sin, God 
wills man’s sin!”23 
 Schleiermacher emphasizes the paradoxical conjunction of original sin and personal 
responsibility. In other words, Schleiermacher recognizes that a racial solidarity in sin is born 
into and becomes part of a corrupt society, but at the same time, he accepts that this common 
sinfulness is built up of the innumerable wrong volitions of individuals. Schleiermacher says 
about sin and the fall: 
                                                
 22 John H. Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 160.  
 23 Ibid., 231.  
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For the contrast between an original nature and a changed nature we substitute the 
idea of a human nature universally and without exception – apart from redemption 
– the same; and … for the contrast between an original righteousness that filled up 
a period of the first human lives and a sinfulness that emerged in time (an event 
along with which and in consequence of which that righteousness disappeared), 
we substitute a timeless original sinfulness always and everywhere inhering in 
human nature and co-existing with the original perfection given along with it … 
finally, for the antithesis between an original guilt and a transmitted guilt we 
substitute the simple idea of an absolutely common guilt identical for all.24 
 
 Schleiermacher supports the conclusion that evil ultimately serves the good purposes of 
God. Schleiermacher and the Irenaean theodicy see human beings as having been created as 
imperfect beings, but also beings who may eventually be brought to the perfection that God 
desires for them in interaction with divine grace. Schleiermacher’s theodicy is close to the 
thought of Irenaeus, so he could be criticized in the same ways as Irenaeus. 
 
 
Recent Theodicy 
 
Process Theodicy 
 Process theodicy approaches the problem of evil from the perspective of process 
metaphysics.  John Cobb, David Griffin, Marjorie Suchocki and Whitehead are well-known 
representatives of this perspective. Process theology claims that the reality of God is not fixed 
                                                
 24 Friedrich Schleiermacher, Christian Faith, ed. H. R. Mackintosh and J. S. Stewart (Edinburgh: T. & T. 
Clark, 1928), 288.  
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and that God’s self is still developing. Process theologians refuse to compromise on God’s 
goodness and try to solve the problem of evil with a radical restriction of divine power. For these 
theologians, the power of God is persuasive rather than coercive. Any suffering in creation is 
also experienced by God, and creation itself is seen as cooperation between God and all creatures. 
Whether this cooperation takes place is thus up to humanity. In other words, God cannot force 
humans to do God’s will, but can only influence them.   
 According to process theologians, God does not have, and never has had, a monopoly on 
power. God cannot prevent natural disasters, atrocities like the Holocaust, or human disease. 
Although God is responsible for evil because God has created the world having the potential not 
only of great good but also of great evil, God is not blameworthy because “God always intends 
the good and always shares the suffering of the creatures in a world in which beauty and tragedy 
are interwoven.”25 Whitehead understands God thus: “The actual but non-temporal entity 
whereby the indetermination of mere creativity is transmuted into a determinate freedom. This 
non-temporal actual entity is what men [sic] call God – the supreme God of rationalized 
religion.”26 
 Even though process theodicy claims the most comprehensive understanding of evil, it 
may be the one most distant from the traditional biblical understanding. Process theodicy rejects 
God’s sovereignty, creation from nothing, and eschatological victory over suffering and evil.  
 
                                                
 25 Daniel L. Migliore, 112.  
 
 26 Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making (Cleveland: The World Publishing Company, 1954), 88.   
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Protest Theodicy  
 Protest theodicy questions the total goodness of God assuming, along with the Bible, a 
very strong view of the sovereignty of God. This view is articulated by John Roth who was 
influenced by the witness and writings of Holocaust survivor and author, Elie Wiesel. Richard 
Rubenstein and Arthur Cohen are also considered representatives of this theodicy.27  
 In the Bible, many scenes of question or protest toward God appear. Jacob wrestled all 
night with a divine adversary, and his new name, Israel, means “you have struggled with God 
and with men and have overcome.”28 Psalmist asks: “How long, O LORD? Will you forget me 
forever? How long will you hide your face from me?”29, “My God, my God, why have you 
forsaken me? Why are you so far from saving me, so far from the words of my groaning?”30, 
“Why have you rejected us forever, O God?”31,  and “How long will the wicked, O LORD, how 
long will the wicked be jubilant?”32 Jesus also protested against God, “My God, my God, why 
have you forsaken me?”33  
                                                
 27 Daniel L. Migliore, 111.  
 
 28 Genesis 32:28. (NIV) 
 
 29 Psalm 13:1. (NIV) 
 
 30 Psalm 22:1. (NIV) 
 
 31 Psalm 74:1. (NIV) 
 
 32 Psalm 94:3. (NIV) 
  
 33 Matthew 27:46. (NIV) 
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 In religious circles, putting God on trial has not been popular. Human beings have 
struggled to protect God’s innocence. However, protest theodicy aims to put God on trial, to be 
for God by paradoxically being against God. John Roth says: 
 God must bear his share, and it is not small unless he could never be described as 
one for whom all things are possible. God’s responsibility is located in the fact 
that he is the one who ultimately sets the boundaries in which we live and move 
are have our being. True, since we are thrown into history at our birth, we appear 
in social settings made by human hands, but ultimately those hands cannot 
account for themselves. To the extent that they are born with the potential and the 
power to be dirty, credit for that fact belongs elsewhere. “Elsewhere” is God’s 
address.34 
 
 Albert Camus also says, “man is not entirely to blame; it was not he who started 
history.”35 Protest theodicy is not just protest against God, but an effort to find God’s faithfulness 
even when it appears that God has ceased to be faithful. A Jewish story summarizes protest 
theodicy well.  
“Could you have done better?” 
“Yes, I think so.” 
“You could have done better? Then what are you waiting for? You don’t have a 
minute to waste, go ahead, start working!”36 
 
 Protest theodicy is criticized that for weakening God’s omnipotence in order to rule out 
the possibility that God can retain his perfect goodness by redeeming all evil. Moreover, Stephen 
                                                
 34 John Roth, “A Theodicy of Protest,” in Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy, ed. Davis, Stephen 
T. (Atlanta: John Knox Press, 1981), 11.   
 
 35 Albert Camus, The Rebel, trans. Robert S. Hartman (Indianapolis: The Bobbs-Merrill Co., 1953), 27.  
 
 36 Elie Wiesel, Messengers of God, trans. Marion Wiesel (New York: Random House, 1976), 35-36. 
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Davis asks: “If God truly has a demonic side, what ground is there for hope? Surely a partially 
evil God may well decide perversely to give us ‘life less abundant’.”37   
 
Liberation Theodicy 
 Liberation theology is a movement in Christian theology which interprets the teachings of 
Jesus Christ in terms of liberation from unjust economic, political, or social conditions. It has 
been described as an interpretation of Christian faith through the poor’s suffering, their struggle 
and hope, and a critique of society and Christianity through the eyes of the poor. Since liberation 
theology is a fight against injustice, it is relevant to discussions of theodicy. 
 However, there is a tension between liberation theology and theodicy. While liberation 
theology says that God is at work in the world liberating the poor and the suffering, evil still 
exists and this threatens the omnipotence of God. James Cone refuses to restrict either divine 
goodness or divine power in order to solve this dilemma. He interprets the Bible as supporting 
courageous human participation in God’s struggle against suffering. The black religious tradition 
sees in the cross God’s struggle against evil and in the resurrection God’s promise of the final 
victory of God over evil and does not focus on the question of the origin of evil.38 God grants 
“power to the powerless to fight here and now for the freedom they know to be theirs in Jesus’ 
                                                
 37 “Critique by Stephen T. Davis,” in Encountering Evil: Live Options in Theodicy, 24.  
 
 38 Daniel L. Migliore, 114.  
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cross and resurrection.”39 Liberation theodicy is sometimes criticized because of its one-
sidedness.  
 
Person-Making Theodicy 
 Person-making theodicy is one of the most powerful theodicies, and John Hick is a 
representative of this view. John Hick explains the main contents of the Irenaean theodicy:  
the creation of man, through the processes of natural evolution, at an epistemic 
distance from God, giving him a basic freedom in relation to his Creator; and 
man’s consequent self-centredness as an animal organism seeking survival within 
a harsh and challenging world which is however an environment in which he can 
develop, as a morally and spiritually immature creature, towards his ultimate 
perfection; this development beginning in the present life and continuing far 
beyond it.40  
 
 Irenaean theodicy considers moral and natural evil as necessary features of the present 
stage of God’s creating of finite persons although the precise forms are contingent. Thus the 
ultimate responsibility for the existence of evil belongs to the Creator. Christianity also believes 
that God bears with us the pains of the creative process.41 
 Hick accepts the main features of the Irenaean theodicy and recomposes it. Unlike 
Whitehead, Hick refuses to limit the power of God working as love. He postulates the existence 
of worlds beyond this one in which persons continue their movement toward the fullness of life 
                                                
 39 James Conn, God of the Oppressed (New York: Seabury Press, 1974), 183.  
 
 40 John H. Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 385. 
 41 Ibid., 385. 
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in love that God intends for all creatures. According to Hick, God, though sovereign, desires not 
puppets but persons who freely render their worship and adoration. Therefore, human beings are 
created incomplete and must participate in the process with free will by which they grow into 
what God intends them to be.42 
  Hick’s weakness is that he stresses growth through the acceptance of suffering rather 
than resistance to suffering, which can and should be removed. This is a common defect off 
those standing in the Irenaean tradition. Moreover, whether we can believe that the postulated 
end can justify the known means and whether all suffering of human life can be rendered 
acceptable by the final good are the serious problems in this theodicy, because the theodicy 
considers evil as a necessary feature of the present stage. Dostoievski presents the negative case 
of this theodicy in The Brothers Karamazov.43 This story implies that if there is a God, in the 
sense of One who is responsible for the evil of the world, then that God cannot be good and 
cannot properly be worshipped as such. To combat this assertion, Hick supposes a great future 
good beyond our present imagining.  
I therefore end by formulating this ultimate question which lies at the heart of the 
theodicy-problem: can there be a future good so great as to render acceptable, in 
retrospect, the whole human experience, with all its wickedness and suffering as 
                                                
 42 Daniel L. Migliore, 113. 
 
 43 “Tell me yourself [Ivan asks his brother Aloysha at the end of a long and agonized discussion of evil], I 
challenge you – answer. Imagine that you are creating a fabric of human destiny with the object of making men 
happy in the end, giving them peace and rest at last, but that it was essential and inevitable to torture to death only 
one tiny creature – that baby beating its breast with its fist, for instance – and to found that edifice on its unavenged 
tears, would you consent to be the architect on those conditions? Tell me, and tell the truth.” “No, I wouldn't 
consent,” said Aloysha softly. (Dostoievski, The Brothers Karamazov, trans. Constance Garnett, from pt. n, bk. v, 
chap. 4.) 
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well as all its sanctity and happiness? I think that perhaps there can, and indeed 
that perhaps there is.44 
 
 Hick believes in the existence of a great future good that makes all evil acceptable. 
Hick’s theodicy is still a matter of debate. Why do evils exist which we cannot know the origin? 
How can people accept God as a positive educator in terrible situations such as genocide, the 
threat of war, and terrorist attack? These are the intractable problems of Hick’s theodicy.  
                                                
 44 John H. Hick, Evil and the God of Love, 386. 
 
 
21 
 
CHAPTER THREE 
CHRISTIAN THEOLOGY AND DAO (聨) IN LAOZI (翀覐) 
 
 
 It is impossible to define in a single word what Dao and Daoism are. Herrlee Creel says 
about Daoism, “I shall not be so foolish as to try to propound a single, sovereign definition of 
what Taoism is.” 45 Creel argues that Daoism does not denote a school of thought, but rather is a 
congeries of doctrines. Julia Ching divides Daoism into Daoist philosophy and Daoist religion. 
As a philosophy of recluses and for recluses, Daoism idealizes obscurity and chooses to 
articulate its teachings in riddles. As a religion, Daoism is esoteric and discloses many of its 
secrets only to the initiated.46 
 The thought of Laozi is conveyed by the Daodejing (Classic of the Way and its Virtue). It 
is comprised of about 5,250 words, and is sometimes referred to as the Laozi. The Daodejing is a 
combination of poetry, philosophical thought, and mystical reflection. Wing-Tsit Chan says of 
the Daodejing, “No one can hope to understand Chinese philosophy, religion, government, art, 
medicine-or even cooking-without a real appreciation of the profound philosophy taught in this 
little book.”47 It is true that no other Chinese classic of such small size has influenced so much in 
                                                
 45 Herrlee G. Creel, What is Taoism?: and Other Studies in Chinese Cultural History (Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1970), 1.  
 46 Hans Küng and Julia Ching, Christianity and Chinese Religions (New York: Doubleday, 1989), 131. 
 47 Wing-Tsit Chan, A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy (New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1963), 
136.  
22 
 
 
China. Therefore, the Daodejing is a proper text with which to do comparative research between 
Christianity and Chinese philosophy.  
 Chapter three is a preliminary chapter to prepare for the discussion of theodicy with Dao 
in Laozi in the next chapter. I will focus on the relationship between Christian theology and Dao 
in Laozi. First, I will briefly explain Laozi’s important Daoistic notion: Dao and Non-action. 
Next, I will look into divine elements that appear in the concept of Dao as articulated by Laozi. 
In the Daodejing, which is composed of 81 chapters, about 10 chapters mention metaphysical 
topics that have been discussed in Western philosophy and theology, and express unique 
thoughts about existence, the cosmos, the world and human order. I will extract some passages of 
the Daodejing and illustrate the relationship between God and Dao. Also I will try to reveal the 
transcendence of Dao and the omnipresence of Dao which are considered important topics in 
theology.  
 
 
Dao and Non-action in Laozi 
 
Dao (Way, 纊) 
 Dao literally means ‘way,’ ‘path,’ ‘route,’ ‘doctrine’ or ‘principle.’ Dao is a metaphysical 
concept originating with Laozi that gave rise to a religion and philosophy. For Laozi, Dao is the 
One, which is spontaneous, natural, nameless, eternal, and indescribable. The concept of Dao 
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was later adopted in Confucianism, Chán and Zen Buddhism and more broadly throughout East 
Asian philosophy and religion.  
 First, Dao is the origin of all extant beings. Dao is the beginning of all changes and the 
ultimate reality of all changes. Dao existed before the universe, and there is no time that Dao 
does not exist. “Nameless, it is the beginning of Heaven and earth. Named, it is the mother of the 
myriad creatures.”48 Laozi explains Dao in the Daodejing, Chapter 51: 
The Way [Dao] produces them [the myriad creatures]; 
Virtue rears them; 
Things shape them; 
Circumstances perfect them.  
This is why the myriad creatures all revere the Way and honor Virtue.  
The Way is revered and Virtue honored not because this is decreed, but because it 
is natural.  
And so the Way produces them and Virtue rears them; 
Raises and nurtures them; 
Settles and confirms them; 
Nourishes and shelters them.  
To produce without possessing; 
To act with no expectation of reward; 
To lead without lording over; 
Such is Enigmatic Virtue!49 
 
 Laozi says that Dao produces, rears, and shapes myriad creatures. Dao is the beginning of 
all things and the way in which all things pursue their route. In other words, Dao is the origin of 
                                                
 48 Laozi, Daodejing, Chapter 1. “肚聐詏襽襺萐, 蛞聐耎肵襺聪.” 
 
 49 Laozi, Daodejing, Chapter 51. “纊苇襺, 繥諚襺, 肵賊襺, 荄茶襺, 萙蝋耎肵翿膻褌纊蝢糿繥. 纊襺褍, 
繥襺糿, 臄翿襺聑蝢芩蟀蕇. 篿纊苇襺, 繥諚襺, 蠃襺蜉襺, 袎襺纏襺, 蓬襺膤襺. 苇蝢膻蛞, 蚾蝢膻萗, 蠃蝢膻蠈, 
萙蛈蚕繥.” (I referred to Philip J. Ivanhoe’s translation in Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy.) 
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metaphysical and physical existence. Dao is the spiritual substance of all beings, the starting 
point of all changes and the ultimate reality of human growth. 
 Second, Dao contains the positive and negative poles and transcends those. For Laozi, the 
nature of Dao is expressed in opposite poles: yin (bright side) and yang (negative side), name and 
nameless, being and non-being, and something and nothing. Laozi says, “To have and to lack 
generate each other. Difficult and easy give form to each other. Long and short off-set each other.  
High and low incline into each other. Note and rhythm harmonize with each other. Before and 
after follow each other.” 50 Dao is the interchange yin and yang, something and nothing.  
 Third, Dao has a circular movement. Dao is revealed in all creatures, but makes those 
proceed to Dao. Laozi says, “Turning back is how the Way moves. Weakness is how the Way 
operates.”51 Dao is not only the origin of all creatures but also their natural habitat. In this point, 
Dao explains well both the origin and formation of all things and the destruction and dissolution 
of all things. The destruction and dissolution of all things is a way to pursuit unity in Dao, so it 
does not contain a negative meaning but has positive directivity.  
  
Non-action (wu wei, 肚蚾) 
 Wu wei, literally “non-action,” “not acting,” “not doing,” “without doing,” “absence of 
doing,” or “non-striving,” is a central concept of the Daodejing. The simplest explanation is that 
                                                
G 50GLaozi, Daodejing, Chapter 2. “篿蛞肚芴苇SG綮蝖芴茶SG蠃縦芴粕SG簙谨芴箲SG蜮茿芴责SG衔趒芴菆Uˉ 
 
 51 Laozi, Daodejing, Chapter 40. “胮螿纊襺纨SG蓅螿纊襺虑U” 
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wu wei means “creating nothingness,” “acting spontaneously,” and “flowing with the moment.” 
Sung-Peng Hsu and H. Wei interpret wu wei as “not-having willful action,” “non-assertion,” or 
“non-interference.”52 Wu wei does not mean literally inactivity but rather taking no action that is 
contrary to nature – in other words, letting nature take its own route.53 Laozi says in the 
Daodejing, Chapter 2: 
The sage manages affairs without action (wu wei).  
And spreads doctrines without words.  
All things arise, and he does not turn away from them.  
He produces them, but does not take possession of them.  
He acts, but does not rely on his own ability.  
He accomplishes his task, but does not claim credit for it.  
It is precisely because he does not claim credit that his accomplishment remains 
with him.”54  
 
 According to Laozi, the sage deals with affairs without action. Moreover, the sage 
spreads doctrines without words. Logically speaking, it is impossible to manage affairs without 
action and to spread doctrines without words. This paradox can be understood after grasping the 
notion of wu wei in Laozi, and this is what distinguishes Laozi’s thought from others. Laozi’s 
idea of teachings without words is opposed to the Confucian ideal because Confucianists would 
not regard silence itself as virtue. 
                                                
 52 Sung-Peng Hsu, “Two Kinds of Changes in Lao Tzu’s Thought,” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 4 
[1074], 332-333.  
 
 53 Wing-Tsit Chan, 136.  
 
 54 Laozi, Daodejing, Chapter 2. “萙蝋茾蝸証肚蚾襺艃SG貇膻蔀襺粊UG肵蟇蓿蝢膻艹SG苇蝢膻蛞SG 
蚾蝢膻萗SG簲茶蝢臼筥UG臄蛑臼筥SG萙蝋膻筤U” 
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 Because non-action is the aggregation of vague concepts, we need to understand it from 
various angles. First, non-action is the limitation of external behavior. Laozi says “never dare to 
put oneself first in the world” in the Daodejing, Chapter 67.  
I have three treasures that I hold on to and preserve: 
     The first I call loving kindness; 
     The second I call frugality; 
     The third I call never daring to put oneself first in the world. 
The kind can be courageous; 
The frugal can be generous; 
Those who never dare to put themselves first in the world can become leaders of 
the various officials.55 
 
 For Laozi, non-action is not to fight and not to put oneself first. This does not mean to 
live in seclusion. People who never dare to put themselves first in the world can become leaders 
of the various offices. The limitation of external behavior is the genuine way of success in Daoist 
life.  
 Second, non-action is the limitation of internal behavior. Here it can be defined as “do 
nothing,” “prefer stillness,” “engage in no activity,” and “be without desires.” These descriptions 
are found in the Daodejing, Chapter 57.  
The more taboos and prohibitions there are in the world, the poorer the people.  
The more sharp implements the people have, the more benighted the state. 
The more clever and skillful the people, the more strange and perverse things arise.  
The more clear the laws and edicts, the more thieves and robbers.  
And so sages say,  
     “I do nothing and the people transform themselves; 
                                                
 55 Laozi, Daodejing, Chapter 67. “葩蛞芓膋SG覀蝢膈襺UG螐蘇螶, 蝊蘇箄, 芓蘇膻笝蚾詏谨苺U 螶篿縑虅, 
箄篿縑籩, 膻笝蚾詏谨苺SG篿縑茶絎蠃.” 
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     I prefer stillness and the people correct and regulate themselves; 
     I engage in no activity and the people proper on their own; 
     I am without desires and the people simplify their own lives.”56 
 
 All things go well if there are not internal and external behaviors. Laozi expresses these 
as “doing nothing (肚蚾),” “prefering stillness (賨裀),” “engaging in no activity (肚艃),” and 
“without desires (肚蘽).” These attitudes allow one to “transform (财),” “correct (袢),” “proper 
(臈),” and “simplify (胟).” 
 Hans Küng explains the importance of non-action: “It is only when the human person, in 
“emptiness” and freed of passions and desires, allows the Tao to rule his or her life; only when 
he or she lets himself or herself be filled by the Tao and quietly abides in purposeless action or 
“doing nothing” (wu-wei) – only then will he or she attain unity with the Tao.”57 Küng regards 
non-action as peoples’ goal according to the universal law of return to the origin. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
G 56 Laozi, Daodejing, Chapter 57. “詏谨縘絚趮S 蝢胐肺舻SG胐縘翈絎SG糑竖螷贐SG蝸縘絊粈SG絓肵螷綀SG
腟罈螷訙SG繿衇縘蛞UG篿茾蝸蚃UG葩肚蚾蝢胐蟀财SG葩賨裀蝢胐蟀袢SG葩肚艃蝢胐蟀臈SG葩肚蘽蝢胐蟀胟Uˉ 
 57 Hans Küng and Julia Ching, 171.  
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Christian Elements in the Concept of Dao in Laozi 
 
Dao vs. God 
 Is Dao similar to the God of Christian theology? This question hinges on whether or not 
we can agree that the sages of non-Christians traditions have access to knowledge of God 
through observation of the cosmos, the natural world and human history. Küng says about this: 
If Dao is everything, if it can be understood as “being in becoming,” would it not 
then ultimately be identical with God? Naturally, this would not be in the 
primitive anthropological or even in the ontological, pantheistic sense. Rather it 
would be understood in the differentiated way of the great occidental 
philosophical and theological tradition from Augustine to Thomas to Nicholas of 
Cusa: as “being itself” to which the being of the existent refers.58  
 
 The doctrine of creation out of nothing (ex nihilo) is not based in the Bible. The writer of 
Genesis says, “In the beginning God created the heavens and the earth. Now the earth was 
formless and empty, darkness was over the surface of the deep, and the Spirit of God was 
hovering over the waters.”59 Whether the creation of Genesis is the creation out of nothing or the 
creation out of chaos is not clear, but Church fathers have accepted the idea of creation out of 
nothing. The clear thing is that God is the origin of creation and all creatures comes from God.  
 Dao is also the origin of all creatures. Dao created all creatures out of non-being. 
Although the notion of non-being (肚) in Laozi does not exactly correspond with the notion of 
                                                
 58 Ibid., 173. 
 59 Genesis 1:1-2. (NIV) 
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nothingness in Western thought, researching nothingness in connection with non-being is a good 
way to understand creation synthetically.  
 The activity of Dao could be compared to God’s providence. The writer of Psalm 104 
says this about God’s providence: “These all look to you to give them their food at the proper 
time. When you give it to them, they gather it up; when you open your hand, they are satisfied 
with good things. When you hide your face, they are terrified; when you take away their breath, 
they die and return to the dust. When you send your Spirit, they are created, and you renew the 
face of the earth.”60  
 How is Dao’s activity revealed in Laozi’s metaphysics? Laozi says, “The Way produces 
them [the myriad creatures]. Virtue rears them, things shape them and circumstances perfect 
them.… And so the Way produces them and Virtue rears them. [The Way] raises and nurtures 
them, settles and confirms them and nourishes and shelters them.”61 Dao, according to Laozi, 
produces and rears all creatures but does not restrict them. Dao produces “without possessing,” 
acts “without expectation of reward” and leads “without lording over.”62 
 In short, Laozi’s conception of Dao is located between the ideas of traditional Christian 
providence and deism. Like Christian providence, Dao is the origin and provider of all beings. 
However, like deism, Dao rears all beings without possessing or lording over them. Therefore, 
Laozi’s concept of Dao is similar to the God of Christian process theology.   
                                                
 60 Psalm 104:27-30. (NIV) 
 61 Laozi, Daodejing, Chapter 51. “纊苇襺, 繥諚襺, 肵賊襺, 荄茶襺.… 篿纊苇襺, 繥諚襺, 蠃襺蜉襺, 
袎襺纏襺, 蓬襺膤襺.” 
 62 Laozi, Daodejing, Chapter 51. 
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 The Transcendence of Dao 
 Transcendence is an important quality of ultimate reality. To discuss Dao and the 
Christian God the transcendence of Dao is necessary. Laozi’s understanding of Dao involves 
transcendence. In the Daodejing, Chapter 35, Laozi says, “But talk about the Way – how insipid 
and without relish it is! Look for it and it cannot be seen; Listen for it and it cannot be heard; but 
use it and it will never run dry!”63 For Laozi, Dao transcends sensual experience. Dao cannot be 
seen or heard, but it works and never runs dry. In Chapter 14, Laozi emphasizes Dao’s 
transcendence of sensory perception: 
Looked for but not seen, its name is “minute.” 
Listened for but not heard, its name is “rarified.” 
Grabbed for but not gotten, its name is “subtle.” 
These three cannot be perfectly explained, and so are confused and regarded as 
one.  
Its top is not clear or bright.  
Its bottom is not obscure or dark.  
Trailing off without end, it cannot be named.  
It turns to its home, back before there were things.  
This is called the formless form, the image of nothing. 
This is called the confused and indistinct.  
Greet it and you will not see its head; 
Follow it and you will not see its tail. 
Hold fast to the way of old, in order to control what is here today.  
The ability to know the ancient beginnings, this is called the thread of the Way.64 
                                                
G 63GLaozi, Daodejing, Chapter 35. “纊襺諨粣SG縸賣絋肚肶UG萣襺膻褊箟SG誀襺膻褊肯SG虑襺膻褊絝.” 
 64 Laozi, Daodejing, Chapter 14. “萣襺膻箟SG聐蘇蝏UG誀襺膻肯SG聐蘇跖UG胜襺膻织SG聐蘇肻UG觧芓螿SG
膻竑講跣UG篿贑蝢蚾螐UG絋芟膻烹SG絋谨膻耫UG萊萊膻竑聐UG臊糾蓯肚肵UG萙蛈肚芳襺芳SG肚肵襺芻UG萙蛈贖赏UG
薛襺膻箟絋菊SG菆襺膻箟絋趒UG觖篴襺纊SG蝋蓮細襺蛞UG縑覌篴萐UG萙蛈纊絷UˉG
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 Laozi’s teachings, “Its top is not clear or bright” and “Greet it and you will not see its 
head, and follow it and you will not see its tail,” show that Dao does not have definite structure 
and transcends the scope of sensual cognition. According to Laozi, the thread of Dao is “not seen 
(膻箟),” “not heard (膻肯),” “not gotten (膻织),” and “cannot be named (膻竑聐).” Therefore, 
Dao is “the formless form (肚芳襺芳),” “the image of nothing (肚肵襺芻),” and “the confused 
and indistinct (贖赏).” 
 Transcendence is the essential nature of God. In the Bible, the transcendence of God 
appears many times. St. Paul says, “One God and Father of all, who is over all and through all 
and in all.”65 Paul claims both the transcendence of God and the intimate nature of God. God is 
not only over all things but also in all things. St. John also says, “The one who comes from above 
is above all; the one who is from the earth belongs to the earth, and speaks as one from the earth. 
The one who comes from heaven is above all.”66 Robert Neville says, “A creator God is 
transcendent as not being among the creatures or a structure of the world created.”67 Therefore, 
the transcendental property of Dao provides a locus for conversation between Laozi’s thought 
and Christian theology. 
 
 
                                                
 65 Ephesians 4:6. (NIV) 
 
 66 John 3:31. (NIV) 
 
 67 Robert C. Neville, Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the Late-modern World (Albany: State 
University of New York Press, 2000), 151.  
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 The Omnipresence of Dao 
 Panentheism is a belief system which posits that the divine exists in all things. The belief 
that God exists in all creatures has been accepted by many theologians. Psalmist says, “Where 
can I go from your Spirit? Where can I flee from your presence? If I go up to the heavens, you 
are there; if I make my bed in the depths, you are there. If I rise on the wings of the dawn, if I 
settle on the far side of the sea, even there your hand will guide me, your right hand will hold me 
fast.”68 The psalmist understands that God is in the heavens and in the depths of the earth. Since 
God exists everywhere, the psalmist confesses, “Where can I flee from your presence?” 
According to the apocryphal Gospel of Thomas, Chapter 77, Jesus says, “Saw wood into pieces, 
and I am there. Lift a stone, and you can find me there.” 
 Daoist thought asserts the omnipresence of Dao. Laozi says, “How expansive is the great 
Way (Dao)! Flowing to the left and to the right. The myriad creatures rely upon it for life, and it 
turns none of them away.”69 Dao is so expansive that it flows everywhere.  
 Zhuangzi, another famous thinker of Daoism, discusses the omnipresence of Dao with his 
disciples in this way: 
The disciple asks, “Where is Dao?”  
 Zhungzi replys, “There are no places which Dao does not exist.”  
 “Tell me clearly,” the disciple insists.  
 Zhungzi answers, “Dao exists in mole crickets and ants.”  
 “How does Dao exist in humble things?”  
 “Dao also exists in foxtails and wild millets.”  
 “How can you say this about still more humble things?”  
                                                
 68 Psalm 139:7-10. (NIV) 
 69 Laozi, Daodejing, Chapter 34. “繗纊腙賚SG絋竑褤虠SG耎肵萗襺蝢苇蝢膻艹.” 
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 “Dao exists in roof tiles and bricks.”  
 “How can you this say about still more humble things?”  
 “Dao exists everywhere even in feces and urine”70 
 
 In this conversation between Zhuangzi and the disciple, Zhuangzi says that Dao exists 
everywhere. To enlighten his disciple, Zhuangzi gives some examples showing the omnipresence 
of Dao. According to Zhuangzi, Dao exists in mole crickets and ants, foxtails and wild millets, 
roof tiles and bricks, and even in feces and urine. This conversation explains Dao’s property of 
omnipresence well. The omnipresence of Dao shows the possibility of connection between Dao 
and the Christian God.  
 In this chapter, I tried to open the possibility of dialogue between Dao and the Christian 
God. In confronting attacks that Dao is totally different from the Christian God, I explained the 
interrelationship between Dao and God I have examined how both Dao and God have the 
properties of transcendence and omnipresence. This shows that Dao is not simply an irreligious 
principle but a kind of ultimate reality just as God is in Christianity. On the base of this 
interconnectedness, I will discuss Christian theodicy through the thought of Laozi.  
                                                
 70 蟻螲蘑诈 覌臦蛽 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
SUPPLEMENTING THEODICY WITH LAOZI 
 
 
 Why does evil occur? How does evil occur? What is the origin of evil? Concerning these 
problems, Laozi does not answer directly. However, the metaphysics of Dao for Laozi offers the 
grounds of discussion about the problem of evil. The problem of evil arises only for religions 
which insist that the object of worship is perfectly good and unlimitedly powerful. Therefore, it 
is possible to get insight about theodicy from religions which have different notions of the 
ultimate reality. Since Dao can be interpreted to mean many things different from the Christian 
God, the notion of Dao can help us embark on a journey regarding the problem of evil and 
theodicy.   
 In this chapter, I will supplement Christian theodicy with Laozi. First, I will explain the 
incomprehensibility of the ultimate reality. Since discussions about theodicy are trials for 
understanding God, the incomprehensibility of the ultimate reality is a way in which the ultimate 
reality can be freed from the problem of evil. Second, I will show the creativity and receptivity 
of Dao. Third, I will explore whether the ultimate reality is always benevolent or not. Fourth, I 
will demonstrate that Dao does not rule creatures. Fifth, I will show that Dao in Laozi contains 
both good and evil. Finally, based on these properties of Dao, I tried to overcome the problem of 
evil in Laozi’s thought.
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The Incomprehensibility of the Ultimate Reality 
 
 Discussions about the ultimate reality usually assume that the ultimate reality can be 
explained with language even though those explanations will not be perfect. However, Laozi 
describes the incomprehensibility of Dao in the Daodejing, Chapter 1.   
A Way that can be followed is not a constant Way.  
A name that can be named is not a constant name. 
Nameless, it is the beginning of Heaven and earth; 
Named, it is the mother of the myriad creatures.  
And so,  
     Always eliminate desires in order to observe its mysteries; 
     Always have desires in order to observe its manifestations. 
These two come forth in unity but diverge in name.  
Their unity is known as an enigma.  
Within this enigma is yet a deeper enigma.  
The gate of all mysteries!71 
 
 Laozi says “A Way that can be followed is not a constant Way. A name that can be 
named is not a constant name.” Most ancient Chinese philosophical schools accepted names as 
good and necessary. However, Laozi rejects names, and this is the radical and unique character 
of Daoism. Chan explains the Dao of Laozi: “Dao is nameless and is the simplicity without 
names, and when names arise, that is, when the simple oneness of Dao is split up into individual 
things with names, it is time to stop.”72   
                                                
G 71GLaozi, Daodejing, Chapter 1. “纊竑纊舭芩纊SG聐竑聐舭芩聐UG肚聐詏襽襺萐SG蛞聐耎肵襺聪UG
篿芩肚蘽蝋籝絋肅SG芩蛞蘽蝋籝絋陬UG觧缌螿纩S 諨蝢蝝聐UG纩蛈襺貧UG貧襺虞貧SG襨肅襺肱Uˉ 
 72 Wing-Tsit Chan, 140. 
 
36 
 
 
 The Daodejing is composed of about 5,250 characters. Among these characters, 545 are 
negative. Therefore, the philosophy of Laozi is generally judged to be a negative philosophy. 
Küng summarizes the negativity of Daoism and Christianity: 
What must also be kept in mind is that, for both Taoist and Christian thought, the 
innermost essence of the Tao, like that of God, remains hidden to human beings. 
Whoever thinks he or she can sneak inside the mystery of God to get a kind of 
inside view of God suffers from the greatest self-delusion. Whoever thinks he or 
she has comprehended God has already misapprehended him. Whoever thinks he 
or she has God in hand comes up empty-handed! His or her grasp extends literally 
into nothingness. On the basis of mystical theology and negative theology, 
Christians can therefore also understand completely why Taoists refuse all 
definitions, all naming of the Tao, whether positive or negative.73  
 
 In the Bible, Isaiah says, ““For my thoughts are not your thoughts, neither are your ways 
my ways,” declares the LORD. “As the heavens are higher than the earth, so are my ways higher 
than your ways and my thoughts than your thoughts.””74 St. Paul says, “Oh, the depth of the 
riches of the wisdom and knowledge of God! How unsearchable his judgments, and his paths 
beyond tracing out! “Who has known the mind of the Lord? Or who has been his counselor?””75  
 Negative theology is theology that attempts to describe God, the Divine, through negation 
or in terms of what may not be said about the perfect goodness that is God. This stands in 
contrast to positive theology. Negative theology is an attempt to achieve unity with the Divine 
                                                
 73 Hans Küng and Julia Ching, 178.  
 74 Isaiah, 55:8-9. (NIV) 
 75 Romans, 11:33-34. (NIV) 
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through gaining knowledge of what God is not, rather than by seeking what God is.76 Negative 
theology is similar to this property of Dao. However, negative theology and the 
incomprehensibility of Dao also have differences. Negative theology is a method which tries to 
know God’s characteristics, but the incomprehensibility of Dao transcends even the possibility of 
description of the ultimate reality by words.   
 The incomprehensibility of Dao and God supports discussion about the 
incomprehensibility of good in God and the qualitative differences of good and love between 
God and creatures. Therefore, the incomprehensibility or the indescribability of the ultimate 
reality, which is characteristic of Dao, provides an alternative way of doing theodicy, albeit in a 
passive and defensive way.  
 
 
The Creativity and Receptivity of Dao 
 
 In western theology, God is the creator of all creatures, and creativity is the main nature 
of God. Alfred North Whitehead gives an explanation of creativity with western terms.  
Creativity is without a character of its own in exactly the same sense in which the 
Aristotelian ‘matter’ is without a character of its own. It is that ultimate notion of 
the highest generality at the base of actuality. It cannot be characterized, because 
                                                
 76 The apophatic tradition is often, though not always, allied with the approach of mysticism, which focuses 
on a spontaneous or cultivated individual experience of the divine reality beyond the realm of ordinary perception, 
an experience often unmediated by the structures of traditional organized religion or the conditioned role-playing 
and learned defensive behavior of the outer man.  
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all characters are more special than itself. But creativity is always found under 
conditions, and described as conditioned.77 
 
 Whitehead understands that creativity is the universal of universals characterizing 
ultimate mater of fact. It is that ultimate principle by which the many become the one actual 
occasion.78  
 For Laozi, creativity is also an important nature of Dao. The Creativity of Dao is revealed 
in the process in which Dao changes one into all creatures. He says, “The Way produces the One. 
The One produces two. Two produces three. Three produces the myriad creatures. The myriad 
creatures shoulder yin and embrace yang, and by blending these qi, “viral energies,” they attain 
harmony.” 79 For Laozi, all creatures came from Dao, and Dao is the origin of all things. Even 
though Dao did not create all creatures directly, like the Creator in Christianity, the creativity of 
Dao is one of the important properties of Dao.  
 However, Laozi does not emphasize only the nature of creativity in Dao. Dao contains 
both the nature of creativity and the nature of receptivity. In the Daodejing Chapter 25, Laozi 
says, “People model themselves on the earth. The earth models itself on Heaven. Heaven models 
itself on the Way. The Way models itself on what is natural.”80 The principle of Dao is 
characterized by spontaneity and Non-action. St. Augustine believes that evil is the absence of 
                                                
 77 Alfred North Whitehead, Process and Reality: An Essay in Cosmology (New York: The Free Press, 
1978), 31.  
 
 78 Ibid., 21.  
 
 79 Laozi, Daodejing, Chapter 42. “纊苇螐SG螐苇蝊SG蝊苇芓SG芓苇耎肵SG耎肵臛蜭蝢诨蓪SG諭絥蝋蚾责.” 
 
 80 Laozi, Daodejing, Chapter 25. “蝸腟襽SG襽腟詏SG詏腟纊SG纊腟蟀蕇.” 
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being or the privation of good. However, for Laozi, non-action or non-being is neither a negation 
of being nor evil. He says, “Turning back is how the Way moves. Weakness is how the Way 
operates. The world and all its creatures arise from what is there; what is there arise from what is 
not there.”81 Nothingness, or non-being, is based on something, or being. Therefore, returning or 
moving to the opposite side is following the principles of Dao and nature. Regression in 
movement of Dao is receptivity.  
 Since Western theology emphasizes the creativity of God, activities against creativity are 
defined as evil. If being is good, non-being is evil. If life is good, death is evil. However, this 
kind of diagram is meaningless in Daoism. Dao contains both creativity and receptivity. From a 
Daoist perspective, all activities are part of the movement of Dao. Therefore, in Laozi’s view, 
evil is not a problem that Dao has to overcome. 
 
 
The Problem of Good: Dao Is Not Benevolent. 
 
 The doctrine of theodicy is based on the goodness of God. If we accept that God may 
sometimes be bad, the problem of theodicy can easily be settled because it is meaningless for 
God to take responsibility for evil. Laozi, however, does not set Dao’s goodness forth as a 
premise. According to the Daodejing Chapter 5: 
 
                                                
 81 Laozi, Daodejing, Chapter 40. “胮螿纊襺纨SG蓅螿纊襺虑UG詏谨耎肵苇蓯蛞SG蛞苇蓯肚.” 
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Heaven and earth are not benevolent; 
They treat the myriad creatures as straw dogs. 
Sages are not benevolent; 
They treat the people as straw dogs.  
Is not the space between Heaven and earth like a bellows? 
Empty yet inexhaustible! 
Work it and more will come forth. 
An excess of speech will lead to exhaustion, 
It is better to hold on to the mean.82 
 
 In my review of theodicy, it is important to focus on “Heaven and earth are not 
benevolent. They treat the myriad creatures as straw dogs.” “Heaven and earth” are both 
different expressions of Dao, each revealing properties of Dao. Chang Chung-Yuan claims that 
heaven represents the highest divinity.83 In other words, Chapter 5 asserts that Dao is not 
benevolent. 
 Suspicion and concern about the origin of suffering and evil are universal for all of 
humankind regardless of religion. Küng refers to this suspicion properly: 
Indeed, in the light of all the natural catastrophes, all the absurdities of life, all the 
orgies of evil, all the rivers of blood and tears, all the murdered innocents, is 
complaining enough? Complaints can be found everywhere in China as well. Does 
it not seem more than justified to go beyond complaint to accusation, and 
accusation that cries to heaven in the face of that divine primal principle that is, 
after all, responsible for order and harmony in the world? And it does not matter if 
one calls this Heaven, Tao, Lord-on-high, Great Ultimate, Divinity, or God.84 
 
                                                
 82 Laozi, Daodejing, Chapter 5. “詏襽膻蝹SG蝋耎肵蚾請粸UG茾蝸膻蝹SG蝋腆茲蚾請粸UG詏襽襺笋. 絋蛫
珽蚌塵UG貓蝢膻糞SG纨蝢蛚諨UG縘蔀莡糤SG膻蔒莗襦.” 
 83 Chang Chung-Yuan, Creativity and Taoism (New York: Harper & Row Publisher, 1970), 59.  
 84 Hans Küng and Julia Ching, 187.  
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 Jen (benevolence, 蝹) is the basic spirit of inner morals and social norms in 
Confucianism. Therefore, the sentence, “Heaven and earth are not benevolent,” critiques 
Kongzi’s thought represented by the concept of jen. Thus, Laozi attacks the artificiality of 
Confucianism. The reason evil is a severe problem in Christian theology is that people assume 
God is benevolent. For Laozi, Dao is not imprisoned by the categories of good and bad. Laozi’s 
understanding of Dao forces us rethink whether we can actually call God to account for evil.  
 
 
The Problem of Responsibility: Dao Does Not Rule Creatures. 
 
 To discuss the doctrine of theodicy people have basically to presuppose that God takes 
responsibility for world matters. Both the Christian God and Dao in Laozi’s thought are the 
origin of all creatures. God and Dao also create and nurture creatures. In Genesis 1:1, “In the 
beginning God created the heavens and the earth.” In the Daodejing chapter 51, Laozi says about 
Dao’s role.  
The Way produces them and Virtue rears them; 
Raises and nurtures them; 
Settles and confirms them; 
Nourishes and shelters them.85  
 
                                                
 85 Laozi, Daodejing, Chapter 51. “篿纊苇襺, 繥諚襺, 蠃襺蜉襺, 袎襺纏襺, 蓬襺膤襺.” 
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 In addition to creating and nurturing, the Christian God rules all creatures. David 
confesses, “Your kingdom is an everlasting kingdom, and your dominion endures through all 
generations,”86 and “The LORD reigns forever, your God, O Zion, for all generations.”87 In 
Christianity, there is an order of rank among creatures. God creates male and female and 
commands them, “Be fruitful and increase in number; fill the earth and subdue it. Rule over the 
fish of the sea and the birds of the air and over every living creature that moves on the ground.”88 
The Christian God reigns over all creatures and human beings rule other living creatures.  
 According to the Neo-Confucianist, Chu Hsi (褶距, 1130 ~ 1200), no single physical 
object existed in the beginning except Principle (li). Since this Principle is multiple, physical 
objects are also multiple. This means that without Principle no object can exist. Everything that 
shapes and forms is instrument (qi, 絎). Dao is that which constitutes the Principle of this 
instrument. For Chu Hsi, human beings and other creatures come into being by receiving on 
Ether (qi, 絥). However, human beings’ qi is different from other creatures’ qi. Chu Hsi says: 
The Ether (qi) received by man is perfect and free from obstruction, whereas that 
received by other creatures is imperfect and impeding. In the case of man, because 
he receives it in its perfection, Principle (li) permeates it without anywhere being 
impeded. But in the case of other creatures, because they receive it in its 
                                                
 86 Psalm 145:13. (NIV) 
 87 Psalm 146:10. (NIV) 
 88 Genesis 1:28. (NIV) 
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imperfection, the principle in them is impeded and fails to give them 
intelligence.89   
 
 Chu Hsi accepts the order of rank among creatures as in Christianity. The order of rank 
causes responsibility because those who rank higher have the responsibility to care for those who 
rank lower. In Christianity, God is responsible for all matters of the world and God is to blame 
for evil in the world because God reigns over the world.  
 Dao in Laozi, however, does not rule creatures. Laozi says, “To produce without 
possessing; to act with no expectation of reward; to lead without lording over”90 Dao is the 
source of creation and maintenance of all creatures, but Dao does not rule and interfere with 
them. All creatures work by their own spontaneity. Laozi also opposes rule between creatures. 
He says, “Lead without lording over.”91  
 In conclusion, Dao does not govern creatures and does not try to change creatures 
artificially. Therefore, Dao does not directly have responsibility for the problem of evil. The 
Christian God is on a collision course with the problem of evil because Christian theology 
endows God with absolute power for rule over the world. If Christian theology understands God 
in relation to Dao, discussions about Christian theodicy could become more constructive.    
 
                                                
 89 Chu Hsi, Chu-tz· Yü-lei 褶螲蓳羯, 4. 10. (Classified Conversations of Chu Hsi). Referred to as 
Conversations. Comp. by Chu’s disciples and 1st published in 1270. (I referred to Derk Bodde’s English translation 
in History of Chinese Philosophy of Fung Yu-Lan.) 
 90 Laozi, Daodejing, Chapter 51. “苇蝢膻蛞, 蚾蝢膻萗, 蠃蝢膻蠈.” 
 91 Laozi, Daodejing, Chapter 10. “蠃蝢膻蠈U” 
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The Problem of Evil: Dao Contains Both Good and Evil 
 
 The problem of evil has become theologians’ biggest conundrum. Alfred North 
Whitehead says, “All simplifications of religious dogma are shipwrecked upon the rock of the 
problem of evil.”92 This problem can be classified with dualistic or monistic frameworks. In a 
dualistic paradigm, good and evil exist in conflict with one another and human beings and the 
world are affected by the movement of Realities who are in charge of good and evil. 
Zoroastrianism and Manichaeism are two such frameworks. Good-evil dualism can settle the 
problem of evil easily because within this model, Satan, and not God, is responsible for evil. 
However, this dualistic interpretation runs counter to the spirit of the Bible. The Bible’s general 
perspective is that God is the one who supervises life, death, happiness, and misery.    
 Monistic perspectives on the problem of evil assert that evil is not an independent entity 
but rather a privation or absence of being. As mentioned earlier, Augustine says, “Everything 
that exists is good, then; and so evil, the source of which I was seeking, cannot be a substance, 
because if it were, it would be good.”93 This monistic form has been articulated by the Church 
Fathers, the Reformers, Gottfried Leibniz, and Karl Barth. Monistic interpretations support 
God’s omniscience and omnipotence. However, the monistic worldview has difficulty defending 
God’s goodness when confronting specific problems people experience from moral and natural 
evils.  
                                                
 92 Alfred North Whitehead, Religion in the Making, 74.   
 93 Augustine, Confessions, VII. 12. 18.  
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 In contrast, Dao in Laozi’s thought contains a bright side (yang) and a gloomy side (yin), 
something and nothing, life and death, and good and evil. Yin and yang, which compose Dao, 
cannot exist independently. Suffering and death, which are parts of yin, cannot be expelled from 
Dao because yin and yang move interdependently. Laozi explains the complementarity between 
yin and yang several times in the Daodejing.  
Those who are crooked will be perfected.  
Those who are bent will be straight.  
Those who are empty will be full.  
Those who are worn will be renewed.  
Those who have little will gain.  
Those who have plenty will be confounded.94 
 
The heavy is the root of the light.  
The still rules over the agitated.95 
 
And so the good person is teacher of the bad; 
The bad person is material for the good.96 
 
What you intend to shrink, you first must stretch.  
What you intend to weaken, you first must strengthen.  
What you intend to abandon, you first must make flourish.  
What you intend to steal from, you first must provide for.  
This is called subtle enlightenment.97 
 
                                                
G 94GLaozi, Daodejing, Chapter 22. “簝謡衒SG蘊謡覜SG藰謡薔SG诖謡萿SG荑謡织SG縘謡贌U” 
G 95GLaozi, Daodejing, Chapter 26. “襩蚾篕紥SG裀蚾褁糗Uˉ 
 96 Laozi, Daodejing, Chapter 27. “篿苻蝸螿, 膻苻蝸襺艗SG膻苻蝸螿SG苻蝸襺蟅Uˉ 
G 97GLaozi, Daodejing, Chapter 36. “蟧蘽髭襺SG谞篸蟪襺UG蟧蘽蓅襺SG谞篸笶襺UG蟧蘽诗襺SG谞篸跎襺UG蟧
蘽譝襺SG谞篸蔛襺UG萙蛈肻聒Uˉ 
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 This kind of thinking pattern flows consistently in the Daodejing, and it means that two 
extremes participate in the activity of the ultimate reality. This polarity of yin and yang does not 
form an opposition, but each harmonizes and supplements the other. Laozi says in the Daodejing, 
Chapter 2:   
And so,  
To have and to lack generate each other. 
Difficult and easy give form to each other.  
Long and short off-set each other.  
High and low incline into each other.  
Note and rhythm harmonize with each other. 
Before and after follow each other.98 
 
 For Laozi, all creatures are originated by mutual relation. Good and evil also are related 
to each other. When all creatures are revealed, the harmonious combination of yang and yin is 
“good,” and the disharmonious combination of those is “evil.” As yin and yang are indispensible 
to molding reality, good and evil also are inevitable in the cosmological dimension.    
 The idea that good and evil are both important and necessary is also shown in Neo-
Confucianist Chu Hsi’s teaching. He says, “Plants growing are the positive spiritual force (葃), 
plants declining are the negative spiritual force (紀). A person from childhood to maturity is the 
positive spiritual force, while a man in his declining year and old age is the negative spiritual 
force. In breathing breath going out in the positive spiritual force, breath coming in is the 
negative spiritual force.”99 Chu Hsi understands the relationship between positive spiritual force 
                                                
G 98GLaozi, Daodejing, Chapter 2. “篿蛞肚芴苇SG綮蝖芴茶SG蠃縦芴粕SG簙谨芴箲SG蜮茿芴责SG衔趒芴菆Uˉ 
 99 Wing-Tsit Chan, 644.  
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(good) and negative spiritual force (evil) as a part of the relationship between expansion (yang) 
and contraction (yin). In other words, the relationship between good and evil is comparable to 
young and old or breathing out and in.    
 In Christianity, however, good and evil are thought of as opposites that remain apart until 
the end of the earth. At the last day, the kingdom of God will accomplish good and eliminate all 
evils. John writes: “He will wipe every tear from their eyes. There will be no more death or 
mourning or crying or pain, for the old order of things has passed away.”100 Isaiah also says: 
Then will the eyes of the blind be opened and the ears of the deaf unstopped. Then 
will the lame leap like a deer, and the mute tongue shout for joy. Water will gush 
forth in the wilderness and streams in the desert. […] and the ransomed of the 
LORD will return. They will enter Zion with singing; everlasting joy will crown 
their heads. Gladness and joy will overtake them, and sorrow and sighing will flee 
away.101 
 
 In conclusion, in traditional Christian theodicies, the relationship between good and evil 
is considered exclusive. However, good and evil in the Daodejing contain each other and work 
reciprocally. For Laozi, absolute good and absolute evil do not exist. Both good and evil are 
relative concepts. According to Laozi’s thought, we can newly explain Jesus’ teaching, “God 
causes his sun to rise on the evil and the good, and sends rain on the righteous and the 
unrighteous.”102 Even though the Christian concept of God does not contain evil, but God shows 
                                                
 100 Revelation 21:4. (NIV) 
 101 Isaiah 35:5-6, 10. (NIV) 
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all people mercy. This is an important clue in dealing with the problem of evil, and Laozi’s 
understanding of the ultimate reality can enhance this interpretation in theodicy.  
 
 
Overcoming the Problem of Evil in Laozi’s Philosophy 
  
The Origin of Evil in Laozi’s Philosophy 
 In Confucianism, the standard position on the origin of evil is that jen (humanity) is 
corrupted or thwarted by selfishness.103 There are two traditions accounting for selfishness: 
Mencius and Xunzi. Mencius insists on the innate goodness of the individual, and believes that 
society’s influence causes bad moral character. He says, “The way of learning is none other than 
finding the lost mind.”104 Xunzi believes that human nature is originally bad, and the purpose of 
moral cultivation is to develop our natures into good. Whether selfishness comes from social 
influence or human nature, selfishness is considered evil in Confucianism.  
 In neo-Confucianism, the problem of evil was a controversial issue. When his disciples 
asked him how it is that the Ether is differentiated into the pure and the turbid since Principle is 
always good, Chu Hsi answered, “Because, if one speaks only of the Ether, there is some that of 
itself is cold and some that is hot, some fragrant and some bad smelling. In the beginning, how 
could the two (yin and yang) Ethers and the Five Elements have been anything but perfect? It is 
                                                
 103 Robert C. Neville, Boston Confucianism: Portable Tradition in the Late-modern World, 102.  
 
 104 The Mencius 6:A11 in Wing-Tsit Chan, 58. 
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simply because they have since been swished and rolled to and fro, that they are no longer 
perfect.”105 Chu Hsi understands that the two Ethers and the Five Elements were perfect in the 
beginning but they are not perfect anymore because of being swished and rolled around, to and 
fro. This creates lack of harmony, or evil, in the world.  
 In Laozi’s case, it is not easy to find his ideas about the origin of evil because he does not 
divide good and evil dualistically. However, it is possible to infer the origin of evil from his main 
thoughts. Laozi emphasizes non-action, and he rejects intentional actions. For him, intentional 
actions make evil. Therefore, Laozi refuses all actions that cause artificiality. Artificial acts bring 
about artificial division. Laozi says in the Daodejing, Chapter 2:   
Everyone in the world knows that when the beautiful strives to be beautiful, it is 
repulsive.  
Everyone knows that the good strives to be good, it is no good.  
And so,  
To have and to lack generate each other. 
Difficult and easy give form to each other.  
Long and short off-set each other.  
High and low incline into each other.  
Note and rhythm harmonize with each other. 
Before and after follow each other.106 
 
 According to Laozi, all things are relative and complement one another. There is no 
distinction originally; for example, the notion of long and short is derived from intentional 
comparison. Intentional action causes distorted division, and this consequently brings about evil. 
                                                
 105 Fung Yu-Lan, History of Chinese Philosophy, vol. II trans. Derk Bodde (Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1973), 553.  
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Therefore, Laozi says in the Daodejing Chapter 25, “People model themselves on the earth. The 
earth models itself on Heaven. Heaven models itself on the Way. The Way models itself on what 
is natural.”107 The ultimate model of people, earth, heaven, and the Dao is what is natural (蟀蕇). 
What is unnatural produces evil in Laozi’s philosophy.  
 
Overcoming the Problem of Evil in Laozi’s Philosophy 
 For Laozi, the highest good is non-action (wu wei). The way which overcomes the 
problem of evil is to live following the laws of nature without intentional action. Laozi expresses 
the life of sages like this: 
Those who would gain the world and do something with it, I see that they will fail.  
For the world is a spiritual vessel and one cannot put it to use.  
 Those who use it ruin it.  
 Those who grab hold of it lose it.  
And so,  
 Sometimes things lead and sometimes they follow; 
 Sometimes they breathe gently and sometimes they pant; 
 Sometimes they are strong and sometimes they are weak; 
 Sometimes they fight and sometimes they fall; 
This is why sages cast off whatever is extreme, extravagant, or excessive.108 
 
 Anyone who would do something will fail because the world is a spiritual vessel and 
anyone cannot put it to act. Laozi says that the life of sages is to cast off whatever is extreme, 
extravagant, or excessive. It is natural to be sometimes strong, sometimes weak, sometimes 
                                                
 107 Laozi, Daodejing, Chapter 25. “蝸腟襽SG襽腟詏SG詏腟纊SG纊腟蟀蕇.” 
 
 108 Laozi, Daodejing, Chapter 29. “蟧蘽諵詏谨蝢蚾襺, 薿箟絋膻织蝒. 詏谨葃絎, 膻竑蚾蒺. 蚾螿讷襺, 
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fighting, and sometimes falling. According to Laozi, following the laws of nature or living with 
the flow is the life of sages and the way to overcome the problem of evil.  
 Laozi advises rulers several times in the Daodejing because he believes that evils in the 
world come from rulers’ intentional behaviors. The most extreme evil is war because it is an 
extreme intentional behavior. He says:  
One who serves a ruler with the Way will never take the world by force of arms.  
For such actions tend to come back in kind.  
Wherever an army resides, thorns and thistles grow.  
In the wake of a large campaign, bad harvests are sure to follow.  
Those who are good at military action achieve their goal and then stop.  
They do not dare to rely on force of arms.109 
 
 Laozi criticizes the war saying, “Wherever an army resides, thorns and thistles grow.  
In the wake of a large war, bad harvests are sure to follow.” A war is an intentional action for a 
king’s or a national desire between countries.  
 Laozi believes that the gulf between rich and poor is distant from Dao. All people have 
success according to the laws of nature, but some people get more than their share through 
intentional behaviors.  
The court is resplendent; 
Yet the fields are overgrown.  
The granaries are empty; 
Yet some wear elegant clothes; 
Fine swords dangle at their sides; 
They are stuffed with food and drink; 
And possess wealth in gross abundance. 
                                                
 109 Laozi, Daodejing, Chapter 30. “蝋纊褢蝸褨螿, 膻蝋腹笶詏谨. 絋艃賨资, 艗襺荓証, 賓紝苇蓿, 
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This is known as taking pride in robbery.  
Far is this from the Way!110 
 
 Laozi regards people who possess wealth in gross abundance when others are starving to 
death as robbers. He says strongly that this is not the way of Dao (舭纊蒺). He also criticizes 
rulers because their actions create hunger and poverty.   
 The people are hungry because those above eat up too much in taxes;  
This is way the people are hungry.  
The people are difficult to govern because those above engage in action; 
This is why the people are difficult to govern.  
People look upon death lightly because those above are obsessed with their own 
lives; 
This is why the people look upon death lightly.  
Those who do not strive to live are more worthy than those who cherish life.111 
 
 Laozi says that rulers have trouble ruling people because they strive to do something. 
Rulers should not practice intentional actions. These only cause people suffering. According to 
Laozi, not striving to live is more worthy than cherishing life because life is precious but 
cherishing life produces intentional actions.    
 The life which follows the laws of nature is in harmony with all creatures. In this life,  
creatures do not rule over others and all realize the ultimate good – non-action.  Chinese 
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Philosopher, Zhang Zai (蟪蠓, 1020-1077), shows what it means to live with each other in 
“Western Inscription (苣聜).ˉ 
Heaven is my father and Earth is my mother, and even such a small creature as I 
finds an intimate place in their midst. Therefore that which fills the universe I 
regard as my body and that which directs the universe I consider as my nature. All 
people are my brothers and sisters, and all things are my companions. The great 
ruler (the emperor) is the eldest son of my parents (Heaven and Earth), and the 
great ministers are his stewards. Respect the aged – this is the way to treat them as 
elders should be treated. Show deep love toward the orphaned and the weak – this 
is the way to treat them as the young should be treated. The sage identifies his 
character with that of Heaven and Earth, and the worthy is the most outstanding 
man. Even those who are tired, infirm, crippled, or sick; those who have no 
brothers or children, wives or husbands, are all my brothers who are in distress 
and have no one to turn to.112 
 
 Zhang Zai says that heaven is his mother and earth is his mother. All people are his 
brothers and sisters, and all things are his companions. This enlightened view helps people to 
live in harmony with all creatures.   
 In short, the way to overcome the problem of evil in Laozi’s philosophy is to follow the 
laws of nature. Laozi illustrates lives that pursue non-action and Dao: “Dao of heaven does not 
contend but is good at victory, does not speak but is good at responding, does not call but things 
come of their own accord, and is not anxious but is good at laying plans. Heaven’s net is vast. Its 
mesh is loose but misses nothing.”113 The life of non-action is to win without fighting, to respond 
without speaking, to come without calling, and to plan good without anxiety. These things are 
                                                
 112 Zhang Zai, “Western Inscription (苣聜),” in Wing-Tsit Chan, 497.  
 
 113 Laozi, Daodejing, Chapter 73. “詏襺纊, 膻蠖蝢苻萆, 膻蔀蝢苻蜴, 膻荌蝢蟀缃, 袆筝訳徫锧. 
詏耠赨赨, 荟蝢膻葐.” 
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possible because heaven’s net is loose but misses nothing. In other words, the world is perfect in 
itself. If human beings behave intentionally, the world will be ruined. The world should leave as 
it is. Therefore, when all human and nature follow the order of nature, the problem of evil will be 
settled.    
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
 
 
 The study of the problem of evil should not be speculative but existential. Elie Wiesel 
introduces an episode from the death camp Auschwitz in his book Night. One day, a young boy 
was hanged in front of all the prisoners because of a minor mistake. When the boy was dangling 
from the rope, Wiesel was asked by someone. “Where is God now?” and a voice within him 
replied, “Where is He? Here He is – He is hanging here on this gallows.”114 Wiesel’s story 
means that the problem of evil is an existential problem focusing on the profound crisis of faith 
in the experience of terrible affliction.  My interest in the problem of evil started when I was in 
the military as a chaplain in South Korea. North Korea attacked a Cheonan warship and killed 46 
navy men in 2010. In November of the same year, North Korea fired about 160 missiles at 
Yeonpyeong Ireland, and two South Korean soldiers died. Moreover, many soldiers died while 
on duty, for various, unexpected reasons. As a military chaplain, I had to interpret this tragedy to 
Christian soldiers and the bereaved. I had to preach in their language, and this meant that I had to 
explain the problem of evil in Asian traditions. This thesis is a product of my existential 
questions about the problem of evil. 
 In this thesis, I have attempted to supplement the doctrine of theodicy with the teachings 
of Laozi. In chapter two, I explored the doctrines of theodicy in Christian history and their 
                                                
 114 Elie Wiesel, Night (New Youk: Bantam Books, 1982), 62.  
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insurmountable problems. Among many theodicies, I have chosen theodicy of the patristic period 
(Augustine and Irenaeus), Modern Theodicy (Gottfried Leibniz and Friedrich Schleiermacher), 
and Recent Theodicy (Alfred North Whitehead, John Roth, James Conn, and John Hick). In 
chapter three, I investigated Christian elements present in the concept of Dao in Laozi’s thought, 
specifically, transcendence and omnipresence. I tried to open the possibility of dialogue between 
Dao and the Christian God. In confronting attacks that Dao is totally different from the Christian 
God, I explained the interrelationship between Dao and God. In chapter four, I reconsidered the 
doctrine of theodicy in light of Laozi’s philosophy. Here, I noted the incomprehensibility of the 
ultimate Reality and the creativity and receptivity of Dao. Moreover, I examined that Dao is not 
benevolent and Dao does not rule creatures. In regard to the problem of evil, I explained that Dao 
contains both good and evil. Based on these properties of Dao, I tried to overcome the problem 
of evil in Laozi’s thought.  
 Theodicy is a central topic in Christian theology, which discusses God’s righteousness 
and the problem of evil, and thus has been a controversial topic in Christian history. Theodicies 
that minimize the power of evil or deny its reality have been exposed as fantastic and worthless 
in the twentieth century – an era full of destructive wars, acts of genocide, and the possibility of 
nuclear annihilation. Even though many famous theologians have offered their own opinions on 
the topic, there is no theodicy that all theologians accept. Expecting the unification of 
theologians under one theodicy, in fact, is impossible and is not needed. Therefore, I do not 
intend to suggest a solution to the dilemmas of theodicy which theologians have not settled in 
Christian history, rather I want to open new possibilities in the discussion of theodicy with 
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Laozi’s thought. Laozi’s understanding of the ultimate reality is totally different from the 
understandings of Western theologians. Even though it is impossible for Laozi’s interpretation to 
be totally accepted in Christian theology, Laozi’s thoughts will be able to give theologians a 
foothold in new dimensions of theodicy and enrich the discussion.    
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